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INTRODUCTION 
Baudouin Dupret 
Barbara Drieskens 
This book addresses the issue of legal truth. Such an issue is two folded.  On the one hand, there 
is the legal truth as it is told, produced, transformed and made relevant for legal purposes, from 
within the legal system and its actual functioning. The ways in which these stories about „what 
happened‟ are told largely depend on and are oriented to, the relevancies and technicalities of the 
specific context of law practice. On the other hand, legal truth is also what is told 'about the law,' 
from outside the legal body. These are stories of what people think and say about legal happenings, 
and they are told in the performance of some other activity than the law, for different practical 
purposes. In a broader sense, therefore, this book addresses the production of narratives 'in the law' 
and 'about the law.' 
A single reality: one truth? 
In legal contexts, parties are striving to impose their own version of events according to their 
personal intentions and concerns, while the judge is deemed to look for the 'truth' and for the 
'correct version.' The pressing question of „what happened‟ must be answered in order to ground 
the decision. From the alternative versions of the same event emerges an authoritative one, 
produced in the course of the proceedings. Specific to legal contexts, it is the only version of reality 
lifted to the level of „truth.‟ This narrative of truth of any particular case has, moreover, to be 
presented in such a way that general rules can be applied to it. This is what is commonly called the 
legal characterization of facts. 
From a commonsense point of view, there is only one single reality and discrepant versions of 
the same event that must be explained by the intervention of some additional factor that made it 
impossible for one of the parties to correctly account for what happened. In this sense, the legal 
conception of truth, with its one-dimensional representation of what happened, duplicates the 
commonsensical one. As a whole, people acknowledge the claims of objectivity of events (cf. 
Pollner, 1975, 1979, 1987), according to what Searle (1995) would call the existence of an external 
reality. Indeed, for members, events may have been a variety of things, “but all bore down upon 
them with an overwhelming objectivity.” (Eglin and Hester, 2003: 86) 
In a relativistic sense, however, which is the one adopted by post-modern scholars, multiple 
versions of the same event refer to the plural nature of the world and its perception. Some of them 
are related to the intentions and personal concerns of witnesses and the different parties, but there 
seems to be also an intrinsic plurality in any event. As such, this relativistic conception of truth and 
reality runs against common, legal and scientific senses. In other words, it is not because words are 
fallible and account partially that reality does not exist and that there can be no truth claim about 
the world. However, this relativistic conception of truth gains some credibility when, instead of 
originating from some kind of scholarly overhanging and ironic standpoint, it proceeds from the 
people‟s conviction that truth, whatever it can be and wherever it stands, is beyond reach for 
average humankind. Thus, it means that what is needed is a solution to the puzzling and conflicting 
versions that look acceptable to a majority and can be provisionally taken as truthful (cf. Pollner‟s 
critique (1974 and 1987) of Becker‟s version (1963) of the labelling theory). 
Legal adjudication is primarily concerned with fact presentation, since its production according 
to legal and procedural relevancies closely determines the outcome of the whole process. However, 
the final version of „what happened‟ is not necessarily a truthful account of facts; neither does it 
necessarily aim at the production of such truthful account. Legal narratives of „what happened‟ 
may constitute either a version that is accepted by conflicting parties or a version that satisfies the 
legal requirements despite factual gaps. For instance, the judge‟s intimate conviction can be 
deemed enough in case of doubt or parties to a conciliation process can agree upon some account 
that allocates responsibility without being much preoccupied by the exactitude of facts. Thus, 
mutual agreement or plausibility can prevail over the strict correspondence between facts and 
story. In any case, on the basis of facts as processed and presented in the course of the legal process, 
there will be one authoritative truth according to which a ruling will be issued.  
In other words, legal processes are goal oriented and the many parties to any judicial proceeding 
get oriented to those practical goals such as incriminating properties, moral schemes of 
interpretation, and backgrounds of normality.  Without the law, ordinary actions and judgments are 
also morally predicated, by which we mean that they assess every event, every story against some 
background understanding of normality. All members rely on a presumptive background of 
recurrent events, standard routines, commonplace motives and characterology, which are 
constantly instantiated, specified, defeated, and challenged (Lynch and Bogen 1996). This can be 
called the morality of cognition (Heritage 1984). As well, from within the law, legal 'translations' 
of events into legal texts and commonsense assessments of legal events are achieved through moral 
(both normative and evaluative) work. Indeed, beside formal legal definitions, law professionals 
act with regard to categories which are constituted as the normal background of their routine 
activities. According to Sudnow (1987), the legal characterization of facts functions according to 
categories whose definition proceeds from the attuning of legal provisions to common situations 
encountered in daily practice. Henceforth, it can be said that characterization is related to 
normality. Normality informs every step of legal procedures, every action, person, fact or rule 
being assessed according to its conformity to background schemes of normality and its possible 
incongruities vis-à-vis this background (cf. Dupret, this volume). 
The authoritative version of the event forms the basis for the judge to evaluate the behaviour of 
the concerned parties either as legal, according to the norms, or as illegal, transgressing the rules of 
social order or law. The narrative of a particular case has to be presented in such a way that general 
rules can be applied to it (cf. Peters, this volume). This construction of 'objective facts' is already 
anticipated by witnesses, attorneys and other legal actors, who are trying to fit the details in a 
one-dimensional representation of 'what happened' in favour or against someone. Witnesses are 
inevitably conscious about the possible implications of their stories. 
More than veracity, it might be credibility that is at stake in witnesses‟ accounts. The 
comparison between witnesses‟ utterances, statements, testimonies, expertise, on the one hand, 
and, on the other, background schemes of interpretation, which refer to the normal understanding 
of similar situations, closely determines the value attributed to these witnesses‟ statements. Many 
studies on witnessing show that credibility works as a substitute to truth, which also means that 
witnesses‟ interrogation is open to the many parties‟ practical work of deconstruction. Story 
telling, in general, is also intertwined with methods for establishing moral entitlements and 
justifications. For instance, by describing the past, it implicates a range of claimable, assertable, 
and disclaimable rights and responsibilities associated with being a singular person (ibid.: 192; cf. 
Moors, this volume). 
Story telling, in the shape of witnessing, remembering, accounting or entertaining, is thoroughly 
moral, but at the same time, story telling is bound by the practical task at hand. That is, it closely 
depends on the context in which it takes place, such as legal proceedings, friendly conversation, 
historiography, etc. Stories told in conversation, for example, are not composed in advance of their 
telling, but unfold interactionally, intertextually, and dialogically. As Sacks (1989, 1995) puts it, 
conversational stories make use of narrative conventions that “bind together” characters, setting, 
events, and the narrator‟s experience. Audiences make judgments about the plausibility of what is 
told on the basis of what perceivedly happens normally in situations of this type, while storytellers 
anticipate and count on these audiences‟ orientation and continuously design and re-design their 
stories accordingly. This is why and how stories, when they unfold on many years, usually 
transform and adapt to the changing relations between the parties who were involved and to the 
environment of their telling (cf. Zomeño, this volume). Sometimes, stories can even develop and 
transform into important causes of general interest (cf. Schulz, this volume).  
Law as a topic of inquiry or as a source for social history? 
Given the particular character of 'legal truth,' we must draw a sharp distinction between the law 
as a topic of inquiry in its own right and legal texts and stories as a resource for social history. 
When we consider law in its own right, we need to make another distinction between, on the one 
hand, law as a tool for all further legal practical purposes, that is legal codes, precedent, 
jurisprudence as they are used by law practitioners in order to perform their activities (e.g. using 
some precedent as a ground for introducing a petition), and, on the other hand, the description of 
these legal practices in their manifold dimensions, that is the rendering of the many activities that 
led to the production of the law (cf. Ghazzal, this volume). Only the description of such practices 
allows us to better know how truth is practically produced in legal settings. 
Legal narratives and case-reports in particular, constitute a one-dimensional version of reality 
and are to a large extent shaped by the particular context in which they are produced. There are 
theoretical and methodological issues concerning the role of ethnographers and historians as tellers 
of stories and the extent to which legal documents can be used as sources for social history (cf. 
Messick, this volume, and Zomeño, this volume). What is often lost when we take legal texts as a 
resource is the phenomenon, which should nevertheless stand at the core of any inquiry into law: 
law in context and in action. In other words, there is a gap in socio-legal literature because of its 
neglection of the practical dimension of law. Only by considering these sources in their particular 
contexts and finalities can we understand the various meanings which people give them. 
Legal stories in their contexts 
Once it is said that the context of legal stories must be given central attention, we have to remain 
cautious with the mere notion of context. How can we know about the context and what is relevant 
to it? Must context be taken in its narrow or its large understanding? Or, in other words, what is 
contextual and what is not? Without going into much detail, we should emphasize the importance 
of limiting the context to what can be empirically described as relevant to the people participating 
into an action and the enfolding of such action. The context is not what can be observed by scholars 
occupying some kind of overhanging position, such as what Drew and Heritage (1992) call the 
“bucket theory of context,” but what is displayed and oriented to in a very indirect or implicit way, 
by the many people engaged within a course of action (Zimmerman, 1998). According to Schegloff 
(1991: 51; cf. also 1997), it is about “showing from the details of the talk or other conduct in the 
materials that we are analyzing that those aspects of the scene are what the parties are oriented to.” 
In that sense, any legal context is made of the many cultural, institutional, substantive and 
procedural practicalities, relevancies and technicalities that concurred to constraining the specific 
course of action. 
When looking at legal texts, it is precisely the context of their own production that is missing. 
Legal documents are written for legal purposes and, therefore, they tend to hide the conditions of 
their own constitution. In other words, legal documents are polished versions that occult the 
performance that led to their achievement. From an action to an account of that action, from a 
verbal exchange to a written narrative, from a record to a report and from a report to a ruling, there 
is a huge transformation which is achieved. This transformation creates a gap between what 
happened, what is recorded, and what is made into law (cf. Buskens, this volume). Facts of history 
intertwine with the methods of historiography. Factual information is collected and assembled with 
an eye to its inclusion or exclusion within a narrative (Lynch and Bogen, 1996: 76; cf. Messick, this 
volume). It remains, therefore, possible to partly retrieve the steps that led to the formalized and 
polished account by closely looking at texts as practical achievements whose grammars, patterns, 
structures and embodied relevancies are immediately accessible. To put it differently, texts display 
different cultural narratologies, which tell us a lot about the practical conditions of their writing, 
their retrospective and prospective dimensions, their dialogical constitution, their contested nature 
and the ways in which some of these narratives pragmatically became dominant. 
Putting legal texts back in context, it appears that they are both contextualizing and 
contextualized. By contextualizing, it  means that any dealing with them is necessarily to be put 
within the constraining frame of their legal, procedural and institutional relevance. By 
contextualized, it means that each specific legal text is in itself part of a broader textual legal 
network within which it looks both backward and forward. It looks backward, for instance, to the 
provisions of the law to which it makes reference or to some previous police or forensic report that 
provides it with some prejudicial presentation of the facts and the law. It looks forward, for 
example, to its prospective uses by some appellate judge (cf. Wuerth, this volume). Such a 
prospective and retrospective feature of legal texts, which is primarily evidenced by their 
intertextual construction, displays their embedment within a dialogical network of documents 
responding to, and anticipating, each other. 
Beside this dialogical dimension of legal documents, it must also be stressed that they directly 
reflect the many orientations of the parties to the activity in which they are engaged. With regard to 
law professionals, texts and documents often manifest the routine nature of their work and the 
practice through which they perform it; with regard to lay people, the same documents reflect how 
they negotiate the most beneficial or less detrimental solution for their own personal interests, as 
well as the blame-implicative nature of legal proceedings, at both a moral and a legal level. Such 
orientations of the parties are manifested through the use of descriptions and categorizations, the 
backgrounding and foregrounding of elements of information, or the many left-outs appearing 
against the background of proper legal and contextual knowledge. Through the close inspection of 
the many ways in which parties display their orientations and attitudes toward facts, law and legal 
characterization, one can get access to the sense of law‟s practical grammar, that is, the law as it is 
practically produced, lived and experienced by the many people within some process of law. 
To put it in a nutshell, events‟ accounts are largely shaped by the context of their production. 
Although this is explicitly the case in legal contexts, where it is considered as rather normal that 
parties, witnesses and prosecutions or defence representatives orient their narratives according to 
their personal interests and stakes, this is equally true in ordinary situations, where issues of truth, 
identity, knowledge and worldview are radically context-dependent (cf. Moerman, 1974, 1987; 
Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998). This is a reason why stories about what happened within 
courtrooms are often so distant from real-time accounts of what took place in this environment: 
participants, orientations, relevancies, procedures, purposes, motives, ascriptions are necessarily 
context-dependent and cannot therefore be translated and inferred from one context to another (cf. 
Drieskens, this volume). 
What Happened: Legal Truth in Muslim Societies 
The different chapters in this book dealing with 'stories in law' focus on the multiple ways in 
which texts (whether oral, written, or a combination of both) are produced. Some texts are highly 
complex, such as 'translations' from oral to written forms. Attention is paid to the impact of those 
involved in the production of particular texts, such as scribes, judges, and professional witnesses, 
as well as the ways in which these legal specialists allow for or exclude particular voices. In this 
regard, it is important not only to trace the training trajectories of text producers and their 
positioning in the legal system, but also to understand how the public at large turns to them in order 
to 'translate' their cases in terms that make sense within the legal system. Amalia Zomeño addresses 
these phenomena through a discussion of the process of fatwa-giving, whereas Brinkley Messick, 
Rudolph Peters and Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron focus on the production of court records and legal 
judgments. Baudouin Dupret gives an ethnographer's report of how the records of the police and 
the public prosecutor come into being in the present-day in Egypt. Emad Adly analyzes the letter 
written to Imam al-Shafa„i as requests for retribution, formulated as shakwas (complaints). Annelie 
Moors and Léon Buskens look at the ways in which marriage contracts were written down in 
Palestine and Morocco, respectively. Ghazzal and Wuerth show that the "fabric of the law" is not in 
the rules of law per se, but in the outcome of the complex schemes of documentation that make 
each legal case a concrete social reality. 
Turning from the producers of texts to their readers and audiences, one central question focuses 
on the intended publics of these texts. Whereas some documents are only meant to be consulted in 
specific circumstances by a highly restricted number of people, other texts are intended for a 
general public, and this is especially the case in 'stories about law.' This calls for an investigation of 
how particular publics are addressed and how narrators calculate the possible uses and effects of 
their texts. Subsequently, the question is raised of how differently positioned publics interpret 
particular texts. Barbara Drieskens analyzes the way contemporary Egyptian newspapers report 
about healers who deal with djinns and how the public reacts to these stories. Dorothea Schulz 
focuses on the production of radio reports on domestic violence in urban Mali. Lynn Welchman 
reflects on her role as an observer in the courts of Tunis to report on human right issues.  
This volume is divided into four parts. Part One examines aspects of the treatment of legal truth 
throughout Islamic history. Part Two focuses on stories from without the law, when people speak 
about law-related issues outside the framework of legal institutions. Part Three deals with the law 
as it is unfolded and perceived both internally and externally. Finally, Part Four concentrates on the 
legal truth as it is produced within the legal contexts. 
Part One of this book looks at legal truth in various contexts of Middle-Eastern history. In 
Chapter One, Zomeño examines legal opinions (fatwa). In a fatwa, both questions and answers 
were considered legal precedent and compiled as such, so that the social and legal stories were 
transformed into pieces of jurisprudence. Fatwas are literary constructions. The stories told to 
muftis are narratives of what happened at some point in the society of a certain place. They also 
have some textual history that makes them change with the dynamics of Islamic jurisprudence and 
the compilation process. However, these narratives were especially meant to last throughout time 
in their original form: they seek to establish the “official” version of particular events. Zomeño‟s 
contribution raises a number of questions related to this volume: how stories transform into pieces 
of jurisprudence; how there are distinctive layers to the production of legal truth; how legal 
documents do or do not constitute reliable sources for telling the truth about past history; how cases 
are textual adaptations constrained by both legal relevance and procedural correctness. 
In Chapter Two, Peters analyzes the records of the case of a young boy who was beaten in 
school by his teachers. By comparing the various depositions and the subsequent judicial decisions, 
he argues that during the course of the investigation of this case and in the process of sentencing, 
the different versions of the facts are transformed into an authoritative account containing almost 
exclusively the legally relevant elements and presenting a logical and plausible narrative. The 
richness of often contradictory details found in the statements of the parties and witnesses makes 
way for a coherent account shorn of its irrelevant or troublesome details. Peters shows in this 
contribution how to read the structure of a judge‟s sentence, with its backgrounding and 
foregrounding of aspects of the case according to their relevance with regard to the law. 
In Chapter Three, Messick analyzes the records of Yemeni shari„a courts. These records are 
relatively verbatim in that they quote testimony and also reproduce the responses made by the 
parties during the litigation. Some of these responses involve the restatement of that party's 
narrative and an attack on that of the other side, mainly through criticism of the opponent's 
evidence. How may the structure of such legal narratives be analyzed, and what are the 
implications of such analyses for the use of legal narratives in the writing of social history? In 
technical terms, what do the patterns of its legal narratives tell us about the character of a particular 
shari„a court? Messick‟s approach centres on the genre features of such legal narratives and on 
their dialogic nature, that is, how they develop in response to the opposing sides' case. His 
contribution raises the question of how to use the people‟s stories in order to make social history. 
He emphasizes the variety of narratologies among human societies, but also stresses the 
importance of looking at the legal structure of the sources. This shows that legal records are 
polished outcomes of legal practices. 
Part Two of this volume is made up of three chapters dealing with narratives about the law. 
Moors, in Chapter Four analyzes marriage contracts. Marriage contracts are different from most of 
the other legal texts discussed in this volume, as they do not involve the settlement of a conflict. 
Yet, similar to these other texts, dower registrations cannot be assumed to reflect „what happened‟ 
in terms of a true account of what was given and received. This is the more so in the case of a „token 
dower,‟ where there is a complete disjuncture between the sum registered and the gifts provided. 
Still, these contracts present us with a specific format of registering a prompt dower that the parties 
concerned agree about. At the same time, women‟s stories indicate that such token dower 
registrations are not a unified practice and that women in different positions employ different 
material and symbolic logics when they acquiesce in, consent to, or actively attempt to bring about 
a token dower registration. The author shows that there is an obvious gap between the different 
versions of „what happened.‟ Contracts are written for all legal practical purposes and therefore 
never go beyond what is relevant to them. 
In Chapter Five, Schultz examines a debate spurred in 1998, after a case of domestic violence 
had been broadcast on a local radio station in Mali's capital Bamako. It argues that the ways in 
which various actors and political interest groups framed this instance of a family altercation as a 
legal story and as an issue of public controversy shed the light on how issues of social reform are 
currently debated in Mali. The chapter details how the broadcasting of the story on local radio 
constituted a turning point in the framing of the episode as a legal case, and concludes that Malian 
media institutions presently play a critical role in the formulation of legal truth outside the formal 
juridical domain because they help construct a legal case through a series of publicly told stories. 
The political biography of the episode not only reveals the close link between particular definitions 
of propriety, public order, and the establishment of legal truth, but also shows that proponents of 
different political positions take women's moral disposition as an indicator of the moral state of 
society, and as a means to address on what notions of the common good the political community 
should be based. In this chapter, Schultz shows how much the language of the law is attractive 
outside its institutional framework. She documents the process through which one of the existing 
narratives becomes the dominant one. By doing so, she empirically illustrates how ordinary cases 
can transform into causes of general and public interest. 
In Chapter Six, Adly relates the story of sheikh „Amr who, in 1994, started a 100 km-journey 
from Mahallat Rawh, in the governorate of Gharbiyya, in order to leave, on Imam al-Shafi„i‟s tomb 
in Cairo, a 17-line letter accounting for his affair with a woman, his sin, and the lady‟s laxity of 
conduct. Such epistolary confession raises the question of how people address a saint who died 
more than twelve centuries ago and ask for his intercession in mundane disputes; how they can 
express the injustice from which they claim to suffer and how they try to rally the saint to their own 
truth and cause; how they formulate their claim and how they organize their stories. In his rather 
well formulated narrative, sheikh „Amr pleads responsible but not guilty; for this purpose, he uses 
all possible means, ranging from appropriate words to consecrated formulations, valorisation 
process, generalisations, fact re-construction, legal formalism, and indictment formula. Adly‟s 
contribution constitutes an illustration of what people expect from the law, which includes their 
background understanding of it. It also demonstrates how describing people and actions is a way to 
infer rights and duties and to ascribe responsibilities. 
Part Three of this volume is made of contributions which try to capture law as it is seen from 
both sides of the mirror. Buskens, in Chapter Seven, examines documents and their roles in legal 
practice of the Muslim West. Professional witnesses, known in Morocco as „udul, compose their 
documents according to models which are often collected in formularies. Legal documents contain 
highly formalized reports about events which might have legal consequences. Buskens studies the 
way in which professional witnesses construct a document by looking closely at a wedding 
ceremony which took place in Rabat, Morocco in 1989. He compares the events which he 
witnessed himself as an ethnographer to the written text of the marriage deed. The peculiarities of 
the legal document can be understood by looking at the formal procedures prescribed by the law 
and by the models available to the „udul in books known as formularies. According to Buskens the 
practices of the professional witnesses can be understood by considering them as a kind of  
“cultural brokers” who mediate between the cultural understandings of ordinary people living their 
daily lives and the formal requirements of the law. The legal rules framing the events stem from 
state law, as well as Islamic law and local practices. The professional witnesses are involved in a 
process of translating notions taken from everyday life into legally valid language. Buskens‟ 
chapter shows how lawyers work bearing in mind the potential conflicts arising from the texts to 
the writing of which they contribute. In other words, he shows how they operate in reference to 
both legal provisions and social norms. By doing so, they produce documents that are retrospective 
and prospective at the same time. 
In Chapter Eight, Drieskens looks at differences and similarities between stories about healers 
and djinns in the different settings of the court, the press and the neighbourhood talk. Each 
narration presupposes and reflects other versions in other settings and every story about djinns 
forms in one way or another, the basis for a judgment. This judgment can be a verdict about the 
guilt or innocence of the protagonists; it is often the moral evaluation of their behaviour, but it 
involves also the audience‟s appraisal of the story and of the moral positioning and credibility of 
the storyteller. In her contribution, Drieskens examines the specific mechanism through which 
stories trigger further and conflicting accounts of events. She also shows how stories orient to their 
virtual public and anticipate their audience. It means that stories are always prospectively oriented 
to further judgements about their reliability, coherence, documented character, etc. 
In Chapter Nine, Welchman looks at narrations of „what happened‟ in a set of „political trials‟ in 
Tunisia in the 1990s, examining not only the construction in court of „what happened‟ as a basis for 
a ruling in a particular case, but also „what happened‟ on a particular day in court. If, in the 
institutional context of state law, the judge‟s story constitutes the accepted truth that forms the basis 
for the judgement, in the context of the sort of trials under examination here the contention is not 
resolved by the judicial outcome; there is no agreement on the story of „what happened.‟ The 
history of such trials in Tunisia locates the courtroom as an established site of contention between 
the „authorised version‟ of the trial and the truth, as advanced by the prosecution and recorded by 
the judge, and the alternative version of the story put by defendants and their advocates and 
supporters. The latter may add to the „meta-narrative‟ of the overall trial the short stories of dramas 
in court provoked by particular proceedings. The international trial observer (specifically, those 
mandated by non-governmental organisations) plays a key role in the public telling of an 
alternative narrative of what happened on the different levels. In its turn, the construction of this 
„external‟ and „observation‟ narrative is framed by purpose and intent, and is articulated within 
particular constraints of form. Welchman‟s chapter is an account of what can be said about the 
production of legal truth when conducting a proper ethnography. At the same time, it raises the 
issue of the observer‟s impact on such production. It clearly shows how truth in legal contexts is 
framed by textual provisions and procedural constraints, but also by counter-narratives, while it 
also demonstrates how this functioning can be documented and influenced by just attending the 
trial. 
Part Four of this volume concentrates on legal truth as it is produced within legal contexts. In 
Chapter Ten, Bernard-Maugiron makes use of a 2002 decision of the Egyptian Supreme 
Constitutional Court (SCC) as a starting point for examining the reconstruction by courts of both 
facts and laws. The “khul„ law,” which was adopted by the People‟s Assembly in 2000, was 
challenged for unconstitutionality before the SCC by a husband whose wife had asked for a khul„ 
divorce. Through its analysis of the constitutionality of that legal provision, the SCC reconstructed 
different dimensions of what happened in the case itself; in its past decisions; in the elaboration 
process of the khul„ law before the two houses of the Parliament and chose its own version of the 
famous hadith that the khul„ law relies on. The chapter shows how courts undertake a retrospective 
formalisation of law and facts in order to meet the needs of procedural correctness and legal 
pertinence. Bernard-Maugiron‟s chapter illustrates how the judge proceeds in order to give facts 
and statutory provisions a story that can be legally dealt with. It shows that courts are also looking 
at precedents as former legal narratives on related issues. Moreover, it demonstrates how the 
writing of legal legacy can influence the drafting of laws and the production of rulings. 
Abuse and mistreatment of citizens have been a regular feature in the Egyptian police precincts. 
The scope of these phenomena is impossible to determine, with contradicting data from 
non-governmental and governmental organizations. In Chapter Eleven, Wuerth deals with legal 
and judicial (re-)constructions of police brutality and torture during the late 1990s. She does not 
dwell on „what really happened‟ in a particular case, but on the strategies and means – socio-legal 
and medico-legal – by which judicial institutions, governmental and non-governmental 
organizations, and individuals debate and construct police action. The competing legal and 
political „truths‟ about police abuse and its prosecution are laid out in their current political context. 
Socio-legal police strategies are examined for their importance for judicial (re-)constructions of 
police abuse. Lastly, she discusses the role of medico-legal knowledge in prosecutions of 
policemen, and argues that the systemic relationship between law and medicine is predetermined 
by the legal system. Wuerth‟s chapter shows how narratives concerning offences and offenders 
follow scripts which produce decontextualized accounts of facts. It also examines the relationships 
between law and science and demonstrates that the factual authority of science is often 
counterbalanced by its tendency to produce inconclusive reports, thus leaving to the judge the 
possibility to choose from among different possible hypotheses the one that best suits his purposes. 
In Chapter Twelve, Dupret conducts a praxiological study of a trial that was primarily 
concerned with the judicial definition of morality. Be it homosexuality, prostitution or mental 
health, it is possible to observe and describe in a detailed manner the work of the different parties 
who are engaged before the courts in cases related to morality. In such a situation, morality is 
constitutive of a specific domain, insofar as people orient to it as such; that is, as a particular object 
with which certain human activities, like religion, ethics, morals, philosophy and law, are 
concerned. The so-called Queen Boat affair serves as a case study. The author conducts a 
(membership) category analysis of the investigations conducted by the Public Prosecution and of 
other texts produced by the many professional agencies involved in the procedure. It allows him to 
observe the emerging modalities of categories, as well as their inferential properties. In different 
chapters of this volume, authors show how the authoritative version of „what happened‟ is 
produced in the course of the judicial process, the final version of the facts forming the basis for a 
judgement grounded on legal rules. Dupret‟s contribution illustrates, through the analysis of a 
concrete example, how also the moral categories within the rules and the interpretation and 
application of legal rules are not floating entities but belong to the interactions that produced them. 
Chapter Thirteen (Ghazzal) is a textual analysis of a single criminal case from the province of 
Idlib in the north of Syria during the 1990s. There are numerous methodological benefits for 
understanding a legal system through a careful analysis of individual civil and criminal cases. To 
begin, the rules of law that presumably constitute the essence of civil and criminal codes, and 
which are commonly perceived as the „theory‟ from which „practice‟ is derived, do not in 
themselves dictate what happens throughout the complex proceedings of a case. To understand 
what happened in a single case, it is compulsory to primarily follow the actors' documentation of 
the events from their own standpoints, which will eventually lead to a full reconstruction of the 
case from the actors' various viewpoints. Consequently, the "fabric of the law" is not in the rules of 
law per se, but an outcome of the complex schemes of documentation that make each legal case a 
concrete social reality. 
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